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Abstract
Purpose – Thispaperaims to investigate, through the lensof theprincipal–agentproblem, the relationship
between payment of National Hockey League (NHL) salaries and player performance during the period of
2005-2011 and explore the inherent issues within the NHL player compensation and incentive structure.
Design/methodology/approach – The research adopts a pragmatic philosophy with deductive
reasoning. This paper focuses on the NHL season 2005-2011 and undertake analysis of historical player
contracts and performance data of 670 players across 29 clubs to undertake liner regression analysis.
Findings – This paper quantifies potential inefficiencies of NHL league contracts and defines the
parameters of the principal–agent problem. It is identifies that player performance generally increases
with salary, is higher in the first year of a contract and despite decreasing over the life of the contract,
will usually peak again in the final year of the contract.
Research limitations/implications – The research is based around figures from 2005-2011 and
secondary statistical data. The study captures quantitative data but does not allow for an exploration of
the qualitative perspective to the problem.
Practical implications – Entry-level or first contracts are good for all teams and players because they
provide incentive to perform and a reduction of risk to the team should a player not perform to expectations.
The same can be said for players at the other end of the spectrum. Although not typically used much,
performance bonuses for players over the age of 35 allow clubs to “take a chance” on a player and the player
can benefit by reaching attainable bonuses. These findings therefore provide contributions to the practicing
managers and coaches of NHL teams who can consider the results to help shape their approach to
management of players and the planning of teams and succession planning for talent.
Originality/value – The paper presents a comprehensive and current perspective of the principal–
agent problem in NHL and extends the work of Purcell (2009) and Gannon (2009) in understanding
player performance enhancement.
Keywords National hockey league, Guaranteed contracts, Pay to performance problem,
Principal agent problem
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
The increasing wages paid to players in the National Hockey League (NHL) and the
prevalence of longer duration contracts has attracted a great deal of scrutiny in recent
The authors would like to thank and acknowledge Dr Nick Chamandy for his assistance in
validating our statistical approach and our processing of the data sets.















years, particularly in terms of the efficiencies of the league compensation structure.
With tougher economic conditions and the addition of a league-wide team salary cap,
league budgets can no longer absorb overpaid players that underperform.As such, there
is a potential principal–agent problem in the wayNHL contracts are drafted. This paper
explores the inherent issues within the NHL player compensation and incentive
structure and highlights where the principal–agent problem occurs. To do this, we
examine the NHL contract signing process, investigate the relationship between
contract and performance data from 2005-2011 and model player performance. From
this, we quantify potential inefficiencies of NHL league contracts and define the
parameters of the principal–agent problem.
2. Background: the context of the paper
To understand the nature of the principal–agent problem in NHL, it is necessary to
understand the context of the problem. This is split into three elements, the value of the
NHL as a sport and business, the background to how the NHL has developed and,
finally, how contracts and salaries are arrived at and determined.
TheNHL is considered to be the premier ice hockey league in theworld (Wong, 2009).
It is an unincorporated not-for-profit organization that has evolved and operated over
the past 20 years with 30 franchise teams across the USA and Canada. However, the
NHL competes for market share in North American professional sports, and currently
trails the NFL, Major League Baseball (MLB) and the National Basketball Association
(NBA).
Although the NHL lags behind the NFL in revenue, the sport of hockey in North
America has made impressive gains in recent years. However, such gains have been on
the back of a troublesome past. Declining popularity of the sport led to labor disputes
that nearly ended the business in 2004, and the “player lockout”[1], which lasted the
length of the 2004-2005 season was the first time in professional sports that a complete
season had to be cancelled due to contract conflicts (Reece and Brandt, 2008).
The league environment at the time of the lockout saw many owners losing money
due to the lack of parity among teams. The leading cause of the financial turmoil was
associated with rapid league-wide expansion (Andrew, 2003) which affected
profitability and popularity, and increased player salaries (Table I) (Bancker, 2011). The
league expanded rapidly in the early 1990s into new southern markets and relocated
teams that were financially deficient. This made it difficult to attract quality players.
Despite expansion drafts allowing new teams to take players from existing teams, there
remained a disparity in income and quality. Established teams protected their best
players and kept a competitive advantage. Furthermore, new teams were forced to pay
franchise fees to existing members upon entering the league. This allowed existing
teams to spend more and attract better players.
The business model and revenue structure of the NHL is such that it relies primarily
on gate fees to drive its bottom line. The Edmonton Oilers, the NHL’s smallest market
team, had $49 million of their $87 million in revenues come from gate receipts in
2009-2010 (Forbes, 2010). In contrast, the NFL’s smallest market, the Jacksonville
Jaguars, had $38million of their $220million in revenues come from gate fees during the
same year (Forbes, 2010). The majority of the Jaguars revenue came from a league-wide
television contract, of which each teamwas entitled to its share. The NHL has struggled




attendance meant NHL expansion teams spent very little money on players during their
initial years in the league and thus lost their competitiveness. From 2001 to 2004, the
payroll gap widened, as wealthier teams began purchasing talent. It was during this
period that the sport and business suffered as league games results become quite
predictable.
Such an environment created a business philosophy based on spending the most
money to buy success (Eitzen and Sage, 1997). This resulted in a 233 per cent rise in
salary payments over an 11-year period.
While the cancellation of the 2004-2005 season was detrimental to stakeholders, the
lockout proved to be beneficial to the league as a business because there was time to
review league operations and plan for the future. The owners and players agreed to
terms on a new CBA (2005)[2]. The major change was the decision to institute a salary
Table I.




Team Total payroll ($) Team Total payroll ($)
New York Rangers 56,887,037 Detroit Red Wings 77,856,109
Detroit Red Wings 55,107,500 New York Rangers 76,488,716
Colorado Avalanche 51,692,500 Dallas Stars 68,578,885
Dallas Stars 50,050,000 Philadelphia Flyers 68,175,247
St. Louis Blues 47,092,500 Colorado Avalanche 63,382,458
San Jose Sharks 42,070,000 Toronto Maple Leafs 62,458,140
Washington Capitals 41,275,000 St. Louis Blues 61,675,000
Toronto Maple Leafs 41,003,187 Los Angeles Kings 53,833,800
Philadelphia Flyers 40,932,500 Anaheim Ducks 53,296,750
New Jersey Devils 39,151,118 Washington Capitals 50,895,750
Buffalo Sabres 38,690,416 New Jersey Devils 48,931,658
Phoenix Coyotes 34,626,833 Boston Bruins 46,569,000
Los Angeles Kings 34,557,500 Vancouver Canucks 42,074,500
Pittsburgh Penguins 33,677,333 New York Islanders 40,865,500
Carolina Hurrican es 32,473,250 Ottawa Senators 39,590,000
Florida Panthers 32,450,000 Phoenix Coyotes 39,249,750
Boston Bruins 31,875,576 Montreal Canadiens 38,857,000
Chicago Blackhawks 29,700,000 Calgary Flames 36,402,575
Ottawa Senators 29,086,250 Carolina Hurricanes 35,908,738
Anaheim Ducks 28,430,000 San Jose Sharks 34,455,000
Calgary Flames 26,542,500 Tampa Bay Lightning 34,065,379
Montreal Canadiens 26,529,200 Columbus Blue Jackets 34,000,000
Edmonton Oilers 25,050,000 Edmonton Oilers 33,375,000
Vancouver Canucks 24,703,750 Buffalo Sabres 32,954,250
New York Islanders 23,354,760 Chicago Blackhawks 30,867,502
Nashville Predators 18,437,500 Winnipeg Jets 28,547,500
Columbus Blue Jackets 18,287,400 Minnesota Wild 27,200,500
Tampa Bay Lightning 17,989,000 Florida Panthers 26,127,500
Phoenix Coyotes 17,818,175 Pittsburgh Penguins 23,400,000
Minnesota Wild 11,737,500 Nashville Predators 21,932,500





cap for each team. The salary cap (or Cap Hit) is a league-wide regulatory tool based on
the contract amount divided by the length of the contract, and is used to control how
much a team can spend on its players. It was put in place to ensure that clubs could
maintain a viable business as well as help level out the playing field (Rosner and
Shropshire, 2011).
The cap for the 2011-2012 season was set at $64.3 million (the timeline of this
research). As the cap continues to rise so does the salary floor ($48.3 million); this forces
teams in smaller markets to generate more revenues to meet spending (Table II).
The cap numbers are strict and there is no room for error. Having a cap provides
added challenges for general managers and team owners. They now must allocate
money more carefully in the hope of fielding a competitive team without overspending.
The cap floor provides equal challenges for teams in smaller markets, as some find it
difficult to spend until the minimum is “hit”.
In recent years, teams have manipulated the cap by offering players long contracts
with high values up front (present value of cash) and declining values as the player ages.
What this does is create a lower average against the salary cap (or cap hit) and is a
deciding factor for a player choosing one teamover another. A particular problemarises,
in that all NHL contracts are guaranteed and non-negotiable once signed. This forms the
basis of our potential principal–agent problem.
In some cases, general managers have been found to be taking on extra years to a
player contract at league minimum salary to bring down the “Cap Hit”. Some declining
contracts result in the player beingwell above the average age of typical retirement, and
with considerably less salary. For example, Ilya Kovalchuk signed one of the most
publicized deals the NHL history at the age of 27. Kovalchuk originally signed a 17-year
contract worth $102million. However, the NHL commissioner voided the contract based
on the structure of the deal. Consequently, Kovalchuk signed a 15-year contract worth a
total of $100million a fewweeks later. The payout per year and cap hit are demonstrated
in Table III.
While the cap hit only appearsmarginally larger with the second contract ($660,000),
it is significant enough to act as a deciding factor in signing another star player away
from the free agency market. With a contract of this length, it is highly unlikely that
Kovalchuk will ever complete all years of the first contract and potentially not even the
second. So the NHL responded by making a case that, under the current CBA, the first
contract structure was unjust. This does not change the fact that several other contracts
were structured this way before Kovalchuk’s deal.
Table II.
Salary cap and floor
from 2005-2012




























































































































































Under the current market condition created by the salary cap, this style of contract
brings forth an important parallel issue, in that the longer a contract, the higher the risk
to the team that a player becomes undesirable. If Kovalchuk’s team is no longer satisfied
with his performance or effort level, it will be very difficult in a salary-capped league to
find him a new team. Certain contracts become unmovable and force a team to buyout
the unwanted contract for a significant price. The term buyout refers to the option teams
havewhere they pay the player a portion of the remaining salary. The benefit to the team
is that only a portion of his contract counts against the salary cap over an extended
period.
In tough economic conditions, it is presumable thatmost ownerswould disagreewith
wasting of capital, so itmakes the contract processmuchmore important. Consequently,
there are few penalties for players underperforming. Guaranteed contracts provide
security for the players but are risky for the owners. This raises the question as to what
incentive a player has to perform, if he is guaranteed to receive compensation
throughout the duration of his contract, even if the team and manager are trying to
“squeeze” value out of their new signing (David, 2006). The asymmetry of information
available to both players andmanagers creates an incentive problem (Holmstrom, 1979).
Currently, there are no performance bonuses for players unless they are in their first
contract (usually draft picks) or 35 years of age and older. As a result, many players can
be paid in excess of their current performance, wasting precious cap space. This can be
seen as a principal–agent problem related to the environment in which they operate that
is common throughout the workplace and not just in professional sports (Scully, 1994).
Guaranteed contracts with no incentive structures create discrepancies between
managers and players. In other words, management’s expectations of performance
might not match the efforts put forth by the player or team (DeMatteo et al., 1998),
indeed, as Alchian and Demsetz (1972) would assert “Every teammember would prefer




Principal–agent problems ultimately exist in jobs that have some form of hidden
actions, what Sannikov (2008) claims as “output being a diffusion process with drift
determined by the agents unobserved effort”. McEachern (2009, p. 322) defines the
principal–agent relationship as:
[…] a relationship in which one party, known as the principal, contracts with another party,
known as the agent, in the expectation that the agent will act on behalf of the principal.
The problem arises when the goals of an agent are mismatched with those of the
principal. The examples used byMcEachern (2009) are that of the services ofmechanics,
lawyers and stockbrokers, all of which contain some form of hidden or behind the scenes
actions. Actions become difficult to assess, as employers are often behind closed doors,
leading to differing objectives by the agent. This is not the case in professional sports
because the contracts are readily available and the product can be watched. This makes





However, Abdalla (2008) argues that the principal–agent problem is when the
interests of agents are not aligned exactly with those of the principals. The principal–
agent problem, therefore, is thought to arise in NHL in situations where players sign
multi-year contracts which are guaranteed. The principals, however, can only monitor
elements of the agent’s actions resulting in the advancement of the agent’s interests at
the expense of the principal. In the NHL, this definition is apparent as personal habits or
training throughout the summer is difficult for clubs to monitor, making performance
measures incomplete and problematic (Feltham and Xie, 1994).
Abdalla (2008) continues by listing how the employer can respond to the agency
problem. One remedy proposed ties employee compensation to the performance of the
firm, an issue Haubrich (1994, p. 258) highlights as “pay does not depend enough on
performance”. This could work in NHL but may evoke emotions as to who actually
helped the team’s performance (Atkinson et al., 1988; DeMatteo et al., 1998; Idson and
Kahane, 2000). The dangers in creating incentive plans to solve principal–agent problem
is that they create perverse incentives. Abdalla (2008), therefore, proposes another form
of compensation that is more direct, performance-based pay, either year-end bonus or
piece-rate. The year-end bonus is something that most businesses are familiar with and
is a way for a firm to share extra profits at the end of a business year. Piece-rate pay can
be described as being paid by the number of units produced. These are both potential
compensation systems, however, across the NHL, teams have different revenue streams
and players may be inclined to sign with clubs where there is the greatest potential to
earn additional income using their “monopsony power” (Richardson, 2000).
Something the NHL does not do is re-negotiate contracts during the term. Abdalla
(2008) goes on to further suggest other proposals to align the incentives of workers with
employers and that is to pay “seniority” wages. A worker is paid a rate lower than their
marginal productivity upon being hired but see their wages rise as they demonstrate
value to the company. This type of incentive could work well in the professional sports
setting andmore evenly distribute risk betweenmanagement and players and, by using
enforceable contracts, Atkinson et al. (1988) would claim that “the problem of an agents
outputs being affected by the output of others could be diminished [with enforceable
contracts]”. Although as alluded to before, with the current reduction in the free agency
market (the age of 27), it becomes difficult to retain a players services in such a
competitive market. This was evidenced in baseball by Scully (1974) and subsequently
by Richardson (2000) in exploring the NHL in the 1993-1994 season.
3.2 Incentives in organisations
Gibbons (1998) explored four new strands in agency theory that help expand views
about incentives in organizations. However, it is difficult to relate theNHL to one agency
theory in particular, as the business of professional hockey is unique. Gibbons (1998)
demonstrates how the literature on incentives in organizations has made important
contributions, which resulted in new areas of focus beyond the classic trade-off between
insurance and incentives. Gibbons (1998) describes the agent as being risk-averse which
is the key idea in the classic model. It looks at the two extreme cases of receiving no
bonus contracts and contracts which the agent benefits from the total output. The
efficient incentive rate is somewhere in between the two extremes depending on many
factors led by the amount of risk or a person’s risk appetite. Therefore, they typically




important. Gibbons (1998, p. 123) indicates that subjective assessments can be
significant where workers have career concerns, concluding that “career-concern
models show that subjective assessmentsmatter when future compensation depends on
current performance”.
Skill acquisition concentrates on how a firm must evaluate a worker’s potential
contribution to future firm value, rather than what the worker has contributed to date.
Such skill acquisition, relates closely to NHL contracts and the NHL arbitration process,
with the shift from realized performance to potential performance being the challenge
faced by most NHL managers and representing the separation between player and
management. While firms use the promotion rules based on subjective performance
assessments. This raises the issue of how to price a subjective assessment, which is
considerably more complex to quantify in professional hockey. Indeed, as Idson and
Kahane (2000) highlight “team attributes have both direct effects on an individual’s pay,
and indirect effects through altering the rates at which individual player productive
characteristics are valued”.
Similarly, Milne (2007) maintains that reward and recognition programs increase
motivation, performance and interest within an organization. He goes one step
further and asserts that team-based incentives can be more problematic, but if used
correctly, it can result in positive outcomes (Milne, 2007). A view already expressed
by Alchian and Demsetz in (1972, p. 790), who claimed “[…] the team is better, with
team spirit and loyalty, because of the reduced shirking”. Therefore, ideas behind
reward- and recognition-type incentives create a specific culture, promoting loyalty
and fostering teamwork.
3.3 The principal–agent problem in sports
While the former has established the theoretical underpinning of the principal–agent
problem and related key concepts to the NHL, it is useful to understand what work has
been undertaken already in the field of agency theory in sport, and where available, in
ice hockey.
The main research undertaken by sport management scholars focusing on the sport
of ice hockey is the work of Mason and Slack (2001a, 2001b, 2003). Here, the researchers
have highlighted a variety of issues from agent certification programmes to
opportunism by players’ agents within ice hockey. In a broader discussion of agency
theory in sport, the same authors put forward the subject as an alternative theoretical
basis for future research in sport management (Mason and Slack, 2005; Faulkner, 1974).
Having first addressed agency theory in ice hockey, their work has donemuch to outline
the relevance of this approach for research in professional sport as the increased
commercialization and commodification of the industry has led to a greater focus on the
business practices of sport organizations.
Lambrinos and Ashman’s (2007) study uses statistics in an attempt to determine if
arbitrated contracts differ from negotiated contracts. Seven factors are focused on to
help determine both negotiated and arbitrated contracts: overall performance, games
played, league and team tenure, contribution to team performance in previous season,
comparable to similar caliber player and salary to similar caliber player (Lambrinos and
Ashman, 2007). Their results shed light onwhat type of playermight benefit from going
into arbitration and which player might avoid these procedures. This highlights the




awarded a salary of $3.5 million from an arbitrator in 2001-2002 only to receive a salary
of $7.0 million plus a significant signing bonus in free agency the next year (Lambrinos
and Ashman, 2007). The study brings up an interesting issue by claiming that the
marginal revenue product is not likely to be so different from one season to the next and
that someone was not measuring the marginal revenue product correctly (Lambrinos
and Ashman, 2007), a problem highlighted by other prominent researchers such as
Feltham and Xie (1994), Scully (1974) and Richardson (2000).
Purcell (2009) examined the principal–agent problem within professional sports
and specifically with long-term contracts. The lack of perfect information
(Holmstrom, 1979) between managers and players, as well as the guaranteed income
a long-term contract provides, was predicted to present players with incentive to
alter effort (resulting increased or decreased performance), particularly during the
first year of a long-term contract. The results of a regression analysis indicate that
a player’s performance levels decline during the first year; however, the study did
not suggest any increase in performance in the final year (Purcell, 2009). The
regression used in Purcell’s study used data from four major sports leagues in the
USA (MLB, NBA, NFL and NHL), and separated each sport by position and statistics
associated with that position. While it is problematic in that the study only used one
player position for the NHL representation (in this case that of the goalkeeper), it
does highlight a distinct principal–agent problem. Indeed, research by Maxcy et al.
(2002) suggests that “the principal–agent problem predicts that long-term contracts
can create inefficient pay and performance, unless mechanisms exist within the
contract to prevent these”. This contention is similar to Gannon (2009), who
explored NHL player production during contract years. Gannon (2009) hypothesizes
that players will perform better the year their contract expires and worse the first
year into a contract due a decrease in incentive. The study applied nine independent
variables believed to explain the dependent variable points per game. This study
extended the work of Purcell (2009) by also evaluating forwards, not just
goalkeepers, and using a data set of 416 players from one season. The findings
indicated that of the nine independent variables five were found significant.
According to his research, salary and nationality were found to positively affect
points per game whereas year in league, first year and age negatively affected this
performance measure. The last year of contract was found to be statistically
insignificant. However, Gannon (2009) did refer to the work of Krautmann (1990)
who, in examining baseball performance over a period of time, found “shirking”
existed. An issue also highlighted by Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Scully (1994).
According to Krautmann (1990), there was no evidence of players adjusting their
effort level in hopes of signing a bigger contract. This may be what prompted the
President and CEO of the Boston Red Sox, Larry Lucchino to claim that it is widely
believed across front offices that shirking does exist. Lucchino (cited in Gannon,
2009) claimed that it depended on the mentality of the player and that some are more
financially motivated than others.
The next section of our paper focuses on the principal–agent problem, where we
extend the study of the NHL context to represent 670 players of all positions over a





4. The research hypotheses
Based on the previous discussion, it can be seen that theremay be evidence of “shirking”
in a number of forms and studies. While Gannon’s work (2009) indicated no statistical
significance of “shirking” in the first year of a contract, in practice and from other
studies (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Scully, 1994; Purcell, 2009), there is clearly a case to
be explored.
The hypotheses for our work are therefore founded on the concept of “shirking” and
on the nature of contracts offered to NHL players. While we recognize that financial
incentives are important (Franke, 2000), we also take into account the “sports” nature of
the context of the research and the need for players to gain “promotion” to increase their
desirability, fame and transfer prospects. In this respect, promotion is seen as an
increase in a player’s time on the ice, or a player playing with a prominent scorer and
increasing the potential visibility and performance of their contribution to the team e.g.
points scoring. While this measure is subjective, it could be a driver for improving
performance in the later years of a contract as the player seeks to renew of move “up”
their contract value.
These contentions form the basis of our hypotheses as we extend the work of Purcell
(2009) in terms of sample players and potions, and explore contractual components of
the player–performance dilemma in which we see a principal–agent problem.
We have four hypotheses to test:
H1. As a player gets paid more and has a longer contract, the more his performance
diminishes.
H2. The type of contract correlates to performance level.
H3. The number of years of a contract correlates to a decrease in performance level.
H4. A player’s performance increases in the last year of a contract and decreases in
the first year of signing.
5. Research design
The research adopts a pragmatic philosophy with deductive reasoning. A case study is
built around the NHL and uses an analysis of historical player contracts and
performance data found through various online sources (e.g. nhlpa.com, tsn.ca and
capgeek.com) and potential correlations between the data. The performance variables




Name Club Salary Position
Age Games played (GP) Goals (G) Assists (A)
Points (P) Points per game (P/G) Penalty minutes per
game (PIM/G)
Plus minus (PM)
Time on ice per
game (TOI/G)
Short handed time on ice
per game (shTOI/G)
Power play time on ice
per game (ppTOI/G)
Hits per game (Hits/G)
Blocked shots per
game (Blks/G)
Days on roster (DOR) Year of contract signed in
the time period




5.1 The use of statistics in professional hockey
The successful manipulation of existing data in baseball opened the way for debate in
hockey, as well as basketball. Mason and Foster’s (2007) research examined
implementing “Moneyball’s” (Lewis, 2003) theories in the NHL. Lewis (2003) showed
how a resource-constrained team in MLB used statistical analysis to inform its
management decisions through focusing on quantifying player performance. However,
unlike baseball, Gietschier (2005) notes that there is no single statistic to develop a useful
formula. Thorne (2005) furthers this point, claiming hockey has a “ton of numbers and
statistics” yet no “well-established system that tracks to give feedback on what player
brings you the best results”. Ken Holland, a well-respected NHL general manager,
admits that they are trying to find the “best bang for their buck” and believes that
statistics can help. He furthers his statement by recognizing that hockey will never be a
statistics-driven sport like baseball because the games are separated by team effort
more than individual efforts (Dater, 2006).
Despite the former, statistical analyses has been becoming more popular in the
professional hockey industry, making sources of data available (Addona and Yates,
2010; Tarter et al., 2009). However, there has yet to emerge awell-established and proven
way of using such data to help teams manage their players (Thorne, 2005), not to
mention as a foundation for researchers. The next section therefore explains the process
used for this paper.
5.2 Regression model adopted
To understand the model adopted for the research, the starting point is to clarify the
perspective taken for the principal–agentmodel forming the basis of the analysis. In this
paper, various models were considered from profit signaling, peasant and landlord,
employment relationships, gift exchange and contract monitoring. From these, the
latter, contract monitoring was seen as the closest fit for NHL player performance
modeling and allowed for the capture of salary to effort and concepts of shirking, linked
to contracts offered. As such, contract monitoring forms the basis of the principal–agent
model adopted where the player is the principal and the team is the agent. Using this
model, the dependent variables for our study were identified as “points” and “points per
game”, while the independent variables were as listedas follows:
• Games played (GP);
• Age (age);
• Term of contract (contract term);
• Whether it was first year of contract (first.year);
• Whether it was last year of contract (last.year);
• Fraction of contract completed (i.e. contract.year/contract.term) (contract.fraction);
• Salary (on logarithmic scale) (log.salary);
• Salary squared (on logarithmic scale) (log.salary^2);
• Year; and
• Club. [Variables found not to be significant (in addition to above): Position (wing vs




The regression model used is a simple linear group regression and in this research,
relates to points scored related to all contracts, multi-year contracts and points per game
and all contracts (Section 6). The quantitative data are analyzed using these regression
models which account for variation of performance between players, and tries to model
points (or points per game) as a function of games/minutes played, age, year, contract
length, log scale salary and whether the player is in the first or last year of the contract.
The regression is linear regression with an extra random effect term to see if there is a
relationship between the data variables. The covariance is used to tell if variables move
together and determines if variables are related or not. Statistical significance is tested
via t-test and probability values are presented to ensure the relationships are not due to
chance.
Section 6 presents the findings and discusses the three regression models.
5.3 Characteristics of the sample
The sample was composed of 670 NHL players in forward positions from 29 clubs,
playing during the period 2005-2011 seasons. A database was constructed per season
and player performance, position, salary, contract and profile were recorded. An extract
of the database is shown as Appendix. Confidence level of the data recorded is high, as
no estimations were made and all figures used were sourced from the same raw data.
Year-on-year figures are seen as comparable and, while not adjusted for inflation, do
allow for in year comparison and across year correlation or regression.
6. Results
The findings explore secondary data relating to player contracts and performance and
a pragmatic realism perspective to the principal–agent problem.
6.1 Player contract and performance correlation
Measuring the relationship between performance and features of a player’s contract,
while adjusting for confounding variables such as games played, club and year, four
multiple linear regressionmodelswere created. Thesemodels used points and points per
game as a response (dependent) variable and were tested for significant effect using
t-tests and p-values.
Figure 1 explores points and points per game versus salary on the log scale.
It is evident fromFigure 1 that there is a clear increasing trend between points scored
and salary level. This is not terribly surprising, as better-producing players get paid
more. The curve (B) is from the result of a parabola to the points, while curve (A) is the
outcome of modeling coefficients along with average values of the other variables (see
above). The curve (B) suggests that after approximately $5 million, there is no longer an
increasing performance trend. This finding may have interesting connotations for
setting of salary levels.
Figure 2 explores points scored by contract year, including the last year of the
previous contract (marked “last”). The findings are very revealing. For 5-, 4-, 3- and
2-year contracts entirely contained in the sampling period (2006-2011), it indicates
points relative to the first year of the contract, broken down by player. Each colored line
is a player, and, for a given contract year, the plot is that year’s points minus year 1
points. Everything is still a point difference relative to the first year of the contract




For this figure, contracts that were entirely contained within the study period were
included – i.e. first year was 2006 or higher and last year was 2011 or lower.
The initial impression may be that players perform better in their final year,
compared to the first year (H1). If that is correct, then one would see the last point
(furthest right) often above 0. However, this does not consistently occur, indicating a
tailing off of performance and potential “slacking” or “shirking” (Gannon, 2009).
Of course, there are many variable, such as age, that could account for that but it is
worth noting.
To explore this more fully, in addition to the standard multiple linear regression
model, the study allowed for a “random player effect” in the model. This means that it
allowed for the fact that players have a baseline performance or ability level which
varies from player to player. A player’s own performance across the six years of study
tended to vary less than the performance between players. The model assumes that
each player’s baseline performance, as a deviation from the average performance of all
players, is a normal randomvariable. Themodel gives estimates of these values for each
player. Each model is presented next.
6.2 Model summaries
When modeling the performance of players across points scored and points scored per
game, with all contracts and multi-year contracts, Tables V-VIII are formed.
Each model presents the regression results, highlighting the degrees of freedom (df)
as the number of variables free to vary during the computation of the statistical
relationships. t-statistic and p-value indicate the statistical significance of the
relationship between the independent and dependent variables and the likelihood of
the variable groups being different or similar. The t-statistic indicates the relationship of
the foci (in the tables, the foci is points scored or points per game) against the variables.
Where the result is positive, the factor variable relates to the foci. The p-value
determines the probability of “chance”. In this case, where p-value is greater than 0.05,
there is not any statistical significance and a null hypothesis can be accepted. With the
p-value, 0.000 is not the absolute zero but a rounding up of figures to three decimal
places.
Figure 1.
Points vs salary and





TableV indicates positive relationship in foci to variables across games played, contract
term, first year of contract salary and games played in the contract year. This would
seem to indicate that the performance of players does increase with salary in particular
in situations where longer contracts are offered. As may be expected points scored
increases with the more games played but age has little impact, as well as a p-value
leading to caution in interpretation of the result.
Table VI indicates similar results to Table V with particular notable results of
p-value of 0.929 for age and a greater emphasis on salary to points scored. Others results
are much in line with the all contracts findings.
Table VII focuses on points per game for all contracts. From the results, the contract
terms, salary and games played per contract year have significant impacts. As with the
previous results, age has no impact and term of contract seems not to influence the
points per game (in this context). However, the year of contract does seem to have some
relationship to points per game, depending on first or last year of the contract.
Figure 2.
Points by contract




Table VIII reinforces the results from Table VII. This seems to indicate that
performance relationships between all contracts and multi-year only contracts provide
the same results but that themulti-year contracts are less pronouncedwhen linked to the
type of contract but salary has a bigger impact on performance. These results are
discussed more fully in Section 7.
Figure 3 presents the models using all the data (including one-year deals). The
normal distributions illustrated, imply the model assumptions are acceptable.
6.3 Model Predictions
TheModel Predictions below were created using the median Games Played (GP) for the





Variable No. of coefficients Value SD df t-statistic p-value
(Intercept) 1 893.593 126.251 980 7.078 0.000
GP 1 0.408 0.059 980 6.894 0.000
Age 1 0.172 0.244 980 0.703 0.482
Contract.term 1 9.656 1.687 980 5.724 0.000
First.year 1 4.494 1.082 980 4.153 0.000
Last.year 1 4.377 1.628 980 2.688 0.007
Contract.fraction 1 13.220 4.339 980 3.047 0.002
Contract.year 1 6.830 2.034 980 3.357 0.001
Log.salary 1 116.297 17.705 980 6.569 0.000
Log.salary^2 1 3.691 0.619 980 5.967 0.000
Age contract.term 1 0.318 0.062 980 5.146 0.000
GP contract.year 1 0.129 0.027 980 4.826 0.000
Club 29 Not shown
Year 5 Not shown
Club: year 145 Not shown
Table VI.
Model 2. Points, only
multi-year contracts
Variable No. of coefficients Value SD df t-statistic p-value
(Intercept) 1 1,094.078 138.257 773 7.913 0.000
GP 1 0.426 0.072 773 5.924 0.000
Age 1 0.028 0.316 773 0.090 0.929
Contract.term 1 10.072 2.101 773 4.795 0.000
First.year 1 5.179 1.420 773 3.646 0.000
Last.year 1 4.778 1.753 773 2.726 0.007
Contract.fraction 1 14.114 6.007 773 2.350 0.019
Contract.year 1 5.910 2.330 773 2.536 0.011
Log.salary 1 142.803 19.431 773 7.349 0.000
Log.salary^2 1 4.560 0.678 773 6.724 0.000
Age contract.term 1 0.337 0.078 773 4.299 0.000
GP contract.year 1 0.124 0.030 773 4.111 0.000
Club 29 Not shown
Year 5 Not shown




effect sizes. However, they are not ideal because the results appear sensitive to the GP
value and the values of other variables.
The following predictions based on models are as follows:
(1) Prediction 1: Two players with same ability, team, year, age and 76 GP in
two-year contracts, in years 1/2 of contract: player in Year 2 is expected to
produce 3.75 fewer points than player in Year 1.
(2) Prediction 2: Three players with same ability, team, year, age and 76 GP in
three-year contracts, in Years 1/2/3 of contract:
• Player in Year 2 is expected to produce 5.93 fewer points than player in
Year 1.
• Player in Year 3 is expected to produce 2.98 fewer points than player in
Year 1.
Table VII.
Model 3. Points per
game, including all
contracts
Variable No. of coefficients Value SD df t-statistic p-value
(Intercept) 1 12.033 1.685 981 7.142 0.000
Age 1 0.002 0.003 981 0.717 0.473
Contract.term 1 0.119 0.023 981 5.268 0.000
First.year 1 0.056 0.014 981 3.906 0.000
Last.year 1 0.062 0.022 981 2.888 0.004
Contract.fraction 1 0.198 0.057 981 3.445 0.001
Contract.year 1 0.040 0.016 981 2.523 0.012
Log.salary 1 1.619 0.236 981 6.862 0.000
Log.salary^2 1 0.051 0.008 981 6.241 0.000
Age contract.term 1 0.004 0.001 981 4.795 0.000
GP contract.year 1 0.001 0.000 981 5.920 0.000
Club 29 Not shown
Year 5 Not shown
Club: year 145 Not shown
Table VIII.
Model 4. Points per
game, only multi-
year contracts
Variable No. of coefficients Value SD df t-statistic p-value
(Intercept) 1 14.584 1.815 774 8.036 0.000
Age 1 0.001 0.004 774 0.267 0.789
Contract.term 1 0.119 0.028 774 4.308 0.000
First.year 1 0.065 0.019 774 3.512 0.000
Last.year 1 0.070 0.023 774 3.080 0.002
Contract.fraction 1 0.214 0.078 774 2.728 0.007
Contract.year 1 0.033 0.017 774 1.905 0.057
Log.salary 1 1.963 0.255 774 7.703 0.000
Log.salary^2 1 0.063 0.009 774 7.053 0.000
Age contract.term 1 0.004 0.001 774 3.855 0.000
GP contract.year 1 0.001 0.000 774 5.821 0.000
Club 29 Not shown
Year 5 Not shown




(3) Prediction 3: Four players with same ability, team, year, age and 76 GP in
four-year contracts, in Years 1/2/3/4 of contract:
• Player in Year 2 is expected to produce 4.83 fewer points than player in
Year 1.
• Player in Year 3 is expected to produce 5.16 fewer points than player in
Year 1.
• Player in Year 4 is expected to produce 1.11 fewer points than player in
Year 1.
In summary, there is not much evidence of added incentive in the sense that players do
not suddenly “turn it on” in the last year of a contract compared to the first year. The
models indicate that the first year of contract provides a degree of performance which
gradually decreases once contracts have been obtained. The performance then improves
on previous years into the final year of a contract but still not to the level of a first year
contract. This is the essence of the principal–agent problem and an issue for Managers
in the NHL.
7. Discussion
Based on the findings, there is a clear principal-agent problem in NHL. The research has
not sought to attribute blame but rather to explorewhatmay cause such a problem. Such







According to the empirical findings, those of which are of most import are as follows:
• Performance generally increases with salary, but this relationship flattens out at
high salaries (at around $5 million) (H2: true).
• Performance is generally higher in the first year of a contract, adjusting for the
fact that performance decreases with age (H4: false).
• Baseline performance is higher for players with longer contracts; however, this
effect diminishes later in the contract (H1: true).
• A player’s production is expected to decrease slightly over the life of a contract
(both total years and fraction years) (H3: true).
• There is a slight up-tick in production in the final year of a contract, but it does not
usually offset the decline over contract term/fraction (H4: true).
According to the empirical study, performance generally increases with salary, but the
relationship flattens out at high salaries (at around $5 million). A relationship can be
drawnbetween paying a free agent to “keep themon the books” and influence the overall
transfer market. In this sense, the player neither makes the team better nor would the
player become a better player should he receive an extra income. So the question
becomes: for the money the teamwas going to pay for him, what could you get if you were
to replace the player via trade or simply spending dollars elsewhere? This particular case
would suggest that the signing process is more efficient; however, the fact remains that
many players do receive contracts in excess of $5 million and underachieve. This area
requires further research involving interviews with NHL managers and key
stakeholders. As such, it is out with the scope of this initial paper.
Considering the motivating factors found from the empirical study to experiences
within the league, performance is generally higher in the first year of a contract;
adjusting for the fact that performance sometimes decreases with age. This can be
attributed to higher levels of confidence, security and dealing with less pressure. This is
significant because it contradicts Purcell’s (2009) study that examines the principal–
agent problem within professional sport long-term contracts. Purcell (2009) found that
performance levels declined among players in the first year, but noticed a slight increase
in final year performance. Purcell (2009) says players would reduce effort because of the
lack of incentives.
The correlation of game statistics also reveal that there is a slight “up-tick” in
production in the final year of a contract, but it does not usually offset the decline over
contract term. For a player in the final year of his deal, this can be a great motivator. In
essence, playersmay compete harder and play at a higher level to secure a new contract.
As such, a contract year creates an incentive for players to begin the season in their best
physical and mental state and to maximize effort to perform to “have a big year” and to
capitalize on the market. However, this is a highly individualized issue and one which
aligns to professionalism and sportsmanship, thus it depends on human nature.
Krautmann (1990, 1993) and Gannon (2009) found that in baseball players, there was no
evidence of players adjusting their effort level in hopes of signing a big contract. We
expect a similar situation occurs in NHL, indeed Luchino (cited in Gannon, 2009) of the
BostonRed Sox front office claimed that “it depends on thementality of the player [effort




The following three perspectives taken from the empirical analysis show that as a
player gets paid more, and for longer periods of time, then he is more susceptible to
performance decline:
• Baseline performance is higher for players with longer contracts; however, this
effect diminishes later in the contract.
• For older players (roughly 30), the correlation between point production and
contract term reverses.
• A player’s production is expected to decrease slightly over the life of a contract
(both total years and fraction of years).
The previous statements set H1 as true. It becomes apparent that incentives across all
levels could work to eliminate the problem. However, Prendergast (1999) contradicts
this view by suggesting that the addition of incentives to performance can lead to
dysfunctional responses, where workers focus solely on the one performance that will
return the most reward. Futterman and Clegg’s (2011) article in theWall Street Journal
brings this research full circle. The article asserts that professional sports teams are
looking for that extra motive, in this case, statistics, to warrant signing a player to these
high-dollar amounts.
The fans’ lack of satisfaction with a player’s pay to performance ratio is pervasive,
and provides evidence supporting the existence of a principal–agent problem. It does not
take an economist or a hockey expert to determine that there are a few players who are
not “carrying their weight”. However, these views are regarded as subjective, and are
difficult to concretely establish given their often changing nature.
There are many contracts where a player’s pay exceeds his performance after every
season. The problem is that players are unpredictable, and their performance tends to
fluctuate year to year based on a multitude of variables. Historical performance is not a
solid indicator of future performance, although there are the cases every year in which a
player’s performance far exceeds that of his current pay.
8. Conclusions
Our paper has explored the inherent issues within the NHL player compensation and
incentive structure and highlighted where the principal–agent problem occurs. We
examine the NHL contract-signing process, investigated the relationship between
contract and performance data from 2005-2011 and modeled player performance. From
this, we quantified potential inefficiencies of NHL league contracts and defined the
parameters of the principal–agent problem. Our findings indicated a number of
contributions to the field. We see these as relating to practice, policy and theory.
From a practice perspective, it is clear that the principal–agent problem is most
relevant in Restricted Free Agent or second contracts as well as long-term contracts
which take players well into their 30s. It was evident that entry-level or 1st contracts are
good for all teams and players because they provide incentive to perform and a
reduction of risk to the team should a player not perform to expectations. The same can
be said for players at the other end of the spectrum. Although not typically used much,
performance bonuses for players over the age of 35 allows clubs to “take a chance” on a
player and the player can benefit by reaching attainable bonuses. These findings,




who can consider the results to help shape their approach tomanagement of players and
the planning of teams and succession planning for talent.
From a policy perspective, our research has generated interesting findingswhich can
help shape NHL policy. The research revealed three key areas that prove to be
problematic to the NHL:
(1) The death of the second contract, which is described by players signing
long-term speculative deals upon exiting entry-level contracts.
(2) The increasing percentage of revenues awarded to the player salary cap number.
(3) The reduction of free agency age.
These are the three areas at the root of the inflationary contract trend that when coupled
with guaranteed contracts create the principal–agent problem between management
and players and need to be addressed.
To address such issues, the CBA should seek to reduce salaries paid to players to
ensure balance in the partnership. This also gives teamswith smaller revenues a chance
to maintain a viable business. Incentivizing players with special attention to the second
contract could improve the longevity of performance (and effort). Bonus money could
then be completely up to management and the team could realign commitment and
balance authority and responsibility within team management. Arguably, these
suggestions require radical thinking, but realign the principal with agent and encourage
the players to continue to perform throughout the contract term.
With regards to contributions to theory, the first contribution we have made is
through the testing of the four hypotheses. Our results indicated that there is a link
between players pay and the length of contract and the type of contract players are
awarded. This adds to Purcells work by adding additional variables to consider, linked
to performance and extending the player positions. The composite result is a more
holistic understanding of the principal–agent problem in NHL and potential for further
areas of study.
In addition to extending the study of principal–agent issues in NHL, the research also
highlighted the increased interest of sport science and need for research and evidence to
support understanding of performance in all sports at the highest levels. In this regard,
our work has highlighted the potential of athletes prolonging their careers and in the
process sustaining high levels of performance at an age where previously they would
have been considered too old. Alongside this, it is also the case that, as athletes become
bigger and stronger, then in some high-contact sports, the careers of top players may
become shorter as the increased physicality takes its toll on the body. These are
on-going concerns for those involved with elite physical sport, e.g. NFL, NHL or rugby
union, and are likely to become the focus of research across various sports leagues. Our
work has reinforced this important area for future study while extending existing work
on NHL principal agent issues (Purcell, 2009; Gannon, 2009; Mason and Slack,
2001a,2001b).
In addition, it is recognized that there are a number of issues impacting upon this area
and that with something as complex as team performance then a range of factors are
important and can impact upon the issues identified in our paper. The approach put
forward inMoneyball (Lewis, 2003) can be seen to be ever more prominent in the more




incorporating ever-more sophisticated notational analysis techniques has resulted in a
much clearer quantification of individual player performance. Our future research will
explore the views of managers and senior stakeholders in the game relative to the
principle–agent issue. We will also explore the issue of trust in principal–agent
relationships, as this is an area where the opportunism of some agents can have an
impact upon an athlete’s performance (Mason and Slack, 2001a) and influence their
productivity on the ice.
Notes
1. A result of the 2004 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) not being signed.
2. The CBA is a labor agreement between the board of governors (the NHL owners) and the
players, represented by the National Hockey League’s Players Association (NHLPA).
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